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"Hope springs eternal" -and a good thing too. Hope is the
greatest gift nature has given to humankind, for without it we
would undertake nothing, and, assuming we managed to survive,
we would become narrow, crabbed, and mean-spirited creatures.
Legal historians, in particular historians of the fourteenth
amendment, are an enormously hopeful lot. After many years now
of serious study of the amendment, of many scholars poring over
the many pages of the Congressional Globe and the 1866 issues of
the New York Times and the speeches of Andrew Johnson, after a
large number of estimable books by generally competent and mostly
disinterested scholars, can we honestly say we know what the fourteenth amendment was originally intended to mean? Judging from
the three recent studies at hand, the answer is no. All three authors
are more than competent; all three display knowledge of the sources
and of the previous scholarship; all three are clever men, able to
formulate and test hypotheses about meaning and cause. Although
they all show obvious concern for the bearing of the results of their
I. Professor of Law, Fordham University.
2. Practicing Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, and Visiting Professor of Law,
Wake Forest University.
3. Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard Law School.
4. Congdon Professor of Political Science, Carleton College.
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historical research on contemporary constitutional law, none is
plainly guilty of having allowed zeal for constitutional results today
to shape his study of the past. None of these studies is, in other
words, a member of that dread and despicable class, "Law-office
history."
Despite all these virtues, the three disagree almost entirely,
thereby carrying on a tradition of long-standing in this corner of the
scholarly world. Despite the failure of all their predecessors to discover an understanding of the fourteenth amendment sufficiently
persuasive to create a consensus, all three display great hope and
confidence. For the most part, all three base that hope on a similar
thought: if the source materials are only set in the right context,
then, finally, they will speak unequivocally. All meaning, these historians seem to agree, is contextual. The making of the fourteenth
amendment is part of some larger story, and like an incident in a
novel, the meaning of the individual event must be seen as part of
that larger story.
A reasonable thought, that, but, as the three studies show, one
that leads to further problems. The most obvious of the problems is
that each of our authors sets the making of the fourteenth amendment into a different context, as though one of them finds it to be
part of Moby Dick, while another locates it in The House of Seven
Gables.
Robert J. Kaczorowski's study of The Politics of Judicial Interpretation finds the relevant context to be the meaning of the Civil
War and the transformation that cataclysmic event wrought in the
entire constitutional system. "The Civil War and Reconstruction
had a far more revolutionary impact on American constitutionalism
than scholars have appreciated." "The fundamental constitutional
issue" at stake in the war was "whether ultimate sovereignty was
constitutionally delegated to the national or to the state governments." This was "a conflict between national supremacy and
union on the one side and state sovereignty and secession on the
other side." The conflict was resolved on the battlefields in favor of
national sovereignty and union, and after the war in Congressional
Reconstruction in favor of the same.
This context supplies the key to understanding the fourteenth
amendment (and other reconstruction civil rights legislation), because a corollary to the conflict about the location of sovereignty
was a conflict about "where primary authority over the status and
rights of individuals was located, in the nation or in the states."
The victory of the North meant the triumph of the federal government as "the primary authority over the status and rights of citi-
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zens, .
for sovereignty of necessity encompasses such primary
authority." Since the nation is sovereign, national citizenship is the
primary citizenship, a conclusion openly trumpeted in the first sentence of the fourteenth amendment. Since the fundamental status
of persons inheres in their condition as United States citizens, the
federal government possesses the primary power to define and protect these rights: "Congress possessed plenary authority to protect
these rights in whatever manner it deemed appropriate." This congressional "authority over civil rights" was "virtually unlimited."
Although "Congress chose not to destroy the states as separate
political entities" there emerged "a new federalism wherein states
and nation had concurrent responsibility and authority ... to enforce and protect the civil rights of Americans."
Having set the fourteenth amendment into this extraordinarily
sweeping and dramatic interpretation of the age, Kaczorowski proceeds to tell a compelling story. Unlike most of his predecessors
(and unlike the other books under review here), Kaczorowski does
not rehash the old debates in Congress over the various amendments and laws that together made up the civil rights phase of reconstruction. He looks instead to the efforts by federal officialsU.S. Attorneys, members of the Justice Department, and the federal
judiciary-to enforce the body of civil rights legislation. To my
knowledge this story has never been told before, surely not in such
detail.
The story shows an active and energetic enforcement effort, by
no means always successful, but not failing for lack of legal authority. Kaczorowski insists that the new post-war constitutional order
he describes at first furnished more than enough legal clout to secure civil rights. So far as there were difficulties, the causes lay elsewhere, in the very magnitude of the task of enforcing such
unpopular laws over the entire South with so few practical resources. Yet the effort met with far greater success than is generally
appreciated. According to Kaczorowski, the federal effort was on
the brink of crushing the Ku Klux Klan in the early 1870s.
Kaczorowski believes there was widespread acceptance within
the legal community-federal officials and judges-between 1866
and 1873 or so, of the legal doctrine outlined above. The post-war
civil rights legislation was all deemed constitutional by the overwhelming majority of state and federal judges who considered it,
and it provided the basis for large numbers of prosecutions by the
Department of Justice, which also acted on the basis of the new
constitutional theory. The incorporation of the Bill of Rights, and
the idea that the fourteenth amendment reached private conduct-
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doctrines which reappeared in the mid- or late twentieth century, as
apparent innovations-were commonplace and widely accepted in
the 1860s and early 1870s. These were not novelties, as historians
like Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger would have us believe, but
orthodox opinion in Congress, the Justice Department, and the
lower federal courts. Especially telling is Kaczorowski's discovery
that in cases like U.S. v. Mitchell (1872) even the defense conceded
"that Bill of Rights guarantees were among the privileges and immunities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment."
In Kaczorowski's account, the real innovation occurred when
the Court later turned against the new constitutional theory.
Among the most valuable features of Kaczorowski's book is his
demonstration that the judicial tum against the new Constitution
and in favor of the old federalism was preceded by the Grant Administration's tum away from strenuous efforts to enforce the civil
rights legislation. Kaczorowski shows how the political consensus
in favor of civil rights enforcement in the South evaporated over
time. He presents the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of
the fourteenth amendment, beginning with Slaughterhouse in 1873,
as part of this process. The political situation had changed so much
that even many Republicans who had formerly been partisans of the
new Constitution and of strong enforcement of civil rights came to
welcome the Court's burial of their own handiwork, because it provided them with a decent way out of what had become an unpopular and hence politically embarrassing position.
Slaughterhouse and related decisions (e.g., U.S. v. Reese, U.S.
v. Cruikshank) accelerated the process which had generated them.
After 1873 lower courts began to question the constitutionality of
the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, of 1870 and of 1871, and to quash
indictments brought under these acts when they didn't declare them
unconstitutional. The federal justice machinery also lost all zest for
the business, and soon the country moved entirely on to other
things. The sands closed over this episode, this effort to vindicate
the rights of the newest American citizens, so thoroughly that
hardly a memory of the original post-Civil War landscape remained. The post-Slaughterhouse innovations on behalf of the old
federalism took on the appearance of original intentions. "And I,
alone, am left to tell thee."
Once set in this context, it becomes relatively clear what the
fourteenth amendment meant: the assignment of custody over the
fundamental natural and civil rights to the Federal Government,
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, the grant of plenary power
to Congress to do whatever is needed to protect and secure rights.
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Valuable as Kaczorowski's study is, his version of the amendment's context fails in at least three respects. In the first place, his
formulation of the issue of the Civil War-state v. national sovereignty, state v. national custody of civil rights-is too infected by
Calhounian absolutism. It was Calhoun who insisted that the
American federal system must be understood in terms of the iron
logic of sovereignty; in following him Kaczorowski ignores the classic and, in my opinion, far sounder understanding of federalism articulated and defended by the "father of federalism" himself:
[T]hose who deny the possibility of a political system with a divided sovereignty like
that of the U.S. must choose between a government purely consolidated, and an
association of governments purely federal. All republics of the former character,
ancient or modem, have been found ineffectual for order and justice within, and for
security without . . . . In like manner, all confederacies, ancient or modem, have
been either dissolved by the inadequacy of their cohesion, or, as in the modem
examples, continue to be monuments of the frailties of such forms.

If, in other words, our federal system fails to conform to the abstract logic of sovereignty, then so much the worse for the abstract
logic of sovereignty.
According to Madisonian orthodoxy, sovereignty was an attribute of neither the states nor the federal government. It inhered in
the people who decreed both sets of governments equally. Neither
the right of secession, i.e., the right of the states to dissolve the
union, nor the right of the union to supercede the states follows
from this orthodox theory. As the Supreme Court put it in the
post-Civil War case of Texas v. White, the Constitution contemplates "an indestructible union of indestructible states." The rejection of the Southern theory of union on the battlefields of the Civil
War did not imply embracing the opposite extreme view of a sovereign union.
Thus, according to the sounder views of the nature of our
union, the question of the allocation of powers to secure rights cannot be settled by recourse to the abstract question of the locus of
sovereignty. The original Constitution gave a complex answer to
the question of where power to secure rights lay, but it would be
difficult to make a plausible case that this power lay principally with
the general government. Most, if not all, of the architects of Recon- ·
struction understood the Constitution in this way, and it would be
very difficult to show that they intended to change that entirely to
the national sovereignty-plenary power Constitution Kaczorowski
claims emerged from the Civil War.
His own book provides little direct evidence on this last issue,
for he neglects altogether the congressional debates on the amendments and civil rights legislation of the reconstruction era. Much in
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those debates conflicts with the context into which he sets the fourteenth amendment. A particularly important instance was John
Bingham's draft for an amendment, debated in February of 1866
and, after a mixed reception, postponed indefinitely. That draft
would have given Congress "power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states and to all persons in the several states equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty, and property." This proposal would have vested Congress
more or less with the plenary power Kaczorowski believes the new
Constitution promoted by the congressional Republicans contained.
But the congressional Republicans did not react to the proposal as a
reader of Kaczorowski's hypothesis would expect. They did not see
it as expressive of the Constitution they already had, nor were they
pleased with the idea of making this change in the Constitution.
Finally, Kaczorowski's version of context does not easily cohere with much of the evidence he himself presents. A U.S. attorney for Mississippi, for example, had serious uncertainties over how
far the Constitution permitted the Federal Government to reach
into the sphere of criminal law. "Jacobson . . . doubted that
criminal violations of the rights to life, liberty, and property could
be brought within Federal Jurisdiction." And Attorney-General
Akerman was far from certain enough about the matter to reassure
Jacobson. In another set of 1871 cases Judge Hugh Bond of the
District Court in North Carolina, a man notoriously sympathetic to
the aims of congressional reconstruction, vacillated mightily on the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment. In one case, he went so far
as to suggest that the fourth amendment remained "a mere restriction on the United States itself." That is, he seemed to believe that
the fourteenth amendment had not changed the status of the Bill of
Rights as laid down in Barron v. Baltimore. In another case from
the very same year, however, Judge Bond upheld the power of Congress to protect against violations of the second amendment by private persons in the states. There seems to have been a great deal of
uncertainty about the scope of the fourteenth amendment, and Kaczorowski's own evidence shows federal lawyers spending much time
and effort attempting to avoid the national sovereignty/plenary
power theory he attributes to them. The behavior of the actors in
his story, in other words, does not conform well enough to the plot
he posits for them.
Michael K. Curtis focuses his attention somewhat more narrowly on the familiar issue of whether the privileges and immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights.
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He argues the affirmative, as Justice Black did many years ago; but
he does so with a learning and thoroughness that far surpasses
either Black or his source, Horace Flack, or any of the other scholars who have taken up this issue in the years since Black's famous
1949 appendix.
It is not Black, however, but Charles Fairman and to a lesser
degree Raoul Berger who form the backdrop for Curtis's effort.
They both had rejected Black's incorporation thesis, but Curtis believes, like Kaczorowski, that if one only gets the context straight,
one can resolve the controversy over the fourteenth amendment and
the Bill of Rights. Fairman's chief "defect" resulted from his failure to consider "the larger context out of which the fourteenth
amendment grew, including the crusade against slavery and for civil
liberty during the years from 1830 to 1866." Curtis differs from
Kaczorowski in locating the most relevant context in anti-slavery
legal and political theory rather than in the great drama of a Civil
War struggle for sovereignty. Curtis's context, while less panoramic, is in several ways more persuasive and serviceable. Following pioneering work by Jacobus ten Broek and others on the role of
anti-slavery thought, Curtis uses his contextual factors in a specific
and controlled manner. The Republicans who drafted the amendment accepted the natural rights philosophy expressed in the Declaration of Independence, saw the evils of slavery in terms of the
violation of these rights, and defined their post-war tasks in terms of
securing them. Although Curtis does not deny that the Republicans retained some attachment to the old federal system and to
"states' rights," he identifies the natural rights orientation as far
more primary and uses it as a clue to their ultimate purposes.
Slavery was not only itself a violation of natural rights; it provoked violation of other rights, constitutional rights such as the
rights of free speech and free press. These violations outraged antislavery forces during the ante-bellum era. Southern states, for example, attempted to prevent the circulation of any writing challenging the legitimacy of the peculiar institution. These and other
violent attacks on free speech and other rights set part of the context for the Republicans during Reconstruction. They were concerned indeed with the plight of the newly freed blacks, but also
with slavery-inspired misdeeds directed against whites.
More specifically, the anti-slavery partisans had worked out
before the war some peculiar theories about various clauses of the
Constitution, theories that were, perhaps, peculiar to themselves,
but on the basis of which they drafted the fourteenth amendment.
According to Curtis, Fairman missed this dimension of context al-
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together and, interpreting the Constitution according to more orthodox theories, he was nearly deaf to what the drafters were
saying. For this reason so many of them, especially John Bingham,
the chief draftsman of the amendment, seemed to Fairman to be
speaking utter nonsense most of the time. But once one has the
code, the otherwise inexplicable becomes perfectly sensible.
The most important of the Republican theories construed the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 1 of the original Constitution as a protection of "absolute" rights in addition to
or instead of "relative" rights. It was not merely a guarantee that
states extend to citizens of other states the same privileges and immunities that they extend to their own citizens, but that all citizens
are due certain protections as a matter of constitutional right.
There were two further peculiarities in the Republican theory
of privileges and immunities which Curtis could have brought out
more clearly, but which are more or less implicit in his account.
Although he admits there was some ambiguity and vacillation
about the content of the rights protected under this clause, the interpretation on the basis of which the amendment was drafted held
that article IV protected the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the U.S., not those of citizens of the states. The distinction sometimes thought to have been invented by the Supreme Court in
Slaughterhouse in fact underlay the original theory of the amendment. The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States were those rights specifically belonging to U.S. citizens by
virtue of the Constitution or nature of the government of the United
States. The Republicans believed that among those rights were
those specified in the Bill of Rights.
The further peculiarity of Republican theory on the privileges
and immunities of U.S. citizens, that is, on the Bill of Rights, was
this: citizens of the U.S. possess these rights, but not entirely as
legal rights. Vis-a-vis the federal government, they were full legal
rights, because the Bill of Rights in clear terms forbade the federal
government from infringing them and thus empowered the courts
to vindicate those rights when threatened by the federal government. But vis-a-vis the states they were less than full rights.
Although the states had a moral obligation to respect them, deriving from the oath state officers took to uphold the Constitution,
there was no constitutional prohibition against the states' abridging
them, and so neither the courts nor Congress could vindicate these
rights, these privileges and immunities of United States citizens.
Bingham thus frequently argued that the fourteenth amendment would create no new rights, but would nonetheless make the
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Bill of Rights binding against the states. The amendment was built
on the reading of article IV outlined above, but was more explicit
than article IV. It protected the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, (i.e., those rights especially derived from
the Constitution or the nature of the union) against violation by the
states, and thereby armed the federal courts and Congress with
power to intervene against the states if they encroached on these
rights.
Fairman never could understand any of this, because he read
the proceedings with eyes accustomed only to the gloom of more
orthodox constitutional theory. Since the Supreme Court had established in Barron v. Baltimore that the Bill of Rights held only
against the federal government, Fairman could not understand
what Bingham and others could mean when they argued that the
rights in the Bill of Rights were already possessed by citizens, even
against their states. He could only conclude that Bingham was extraordinarily confused, or extraordinarily ignorant, or had a private
and secret meaning for the term "Bill of Rights." None of this was
true: Bingham was a flowery speaker, but he was also an extraordinarily clear thinker; he was generally recognized by people in and
out of Congress as a most able legislator and lawyer (witness the
very high leadership responsibilities with which he was entrustedfor example, he served on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction,
and was one of the House managers of the impeachment of Andrew
Johnson) and, as Curtis decisively demonstrates, Fairman was certainly wrong when he speculated that Bingham had something
other than the first eight amendments to the Constitution in mind
when he referred to the Bill of Rights.
Curtis's interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause
thus flows naturally and persuasively from his account of the context of the amendment. The broad concern with rights, a substantive concern, not just an anti-discrimination concern, the antebellum Republican worry over violations of the rights of whites as
well as of blacks in the states, the special theories they developedall converge naturally on the idea of incorporation. Curtis thus successfully rebuts, in my opinion, the main thrust of Fairman's
argument.
Yet not everyone has been convinced, least of all Raoul Berger,
whose new book reiterates many of the arguments he had earlier
presented in Government by Judiciary, but with the addition of explicit, spirited (to say the least), and sometimes line by line arguments directed against Curtis. Curtis's book, he thinks, "is of the
genre ... advocacy scholarship." It is moved by "passionate dedi-

158

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 8:149

cation to a cause ... which is apt to distort the judgement of what
the facts are, to promote wishful thinking, and to result in partisan
propaganda." But the disagreement between Berger and Curtis
does not (in the first instance) so much concern facts as contexts.
Berger opens his critique with an attempt to undermine Curtis's
construct of context and to substitute one of his own in the guise of
"guides to interpretation." That is, the facts do not speak for themselves, but require context to make them yield their message. "Curtis lives under the grand illusion that the fourteenth amendment
was 'produced' by the 'anti-slavery crusade.' " Berger knows better:
"For understanding the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
continued attachment of the North to States' control of internal affairs is far more important than the abolitionist authority background upon which Curtis so heavily relies." "In seeking to filter
antislavery ideology into the thinking of the majority of the framers,
Curtis is wildly off course."
Berger's drafters, and indeed the whole North, "remained
deeply attached to the principle of states' rights," and this distinguishes them from Curtis's anti-slavery drafters who were committed to natural and civil rights above all. Berger does not deny that
they had some concern for rights: "Outraged by the Black Codes,
the North set out to protect a set of fundamental rights that would
enable emancipated slaves to exist." But Berger believes that
Northerners were uninterested in going further than this minimal
kind of protection, partly because of "rampant racism in the
North." Racism was the dominant force in Northern opinion and
along with it went a "pervasive detestation of the abolitionists."
Berger's notion of context tells him that Reconstruction legislation must stand at the intersection of his three forces: attachment
to state autonomy, racism, and a desire to offer minimal protections
for the rights of the freemen. Curtis's abolitionist amendment cannot, he thinks, be an event in his novel. The first and in a way the
most important manifestation of Berger's three forces was the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. It had duly limited ambitions: to protect certain specified rights, such as the rights to contract, to sue, and to
give evidence. It protected citizens in these rights not absolutely
but only against discriminatory treatment by the states. "The bill
did not postulate an indeterminate catalog of 'absolute rights.' Its
face shows that it struck at discrimination with respect to enumerated particulars." The rights secured in the Bill of Rights were not
among those protected by the Civil Rights Act.
The coverage of the Civil Rights Act is such an important part
of Berger's story because, he says, "the framers deemed the Bill and

1991]

BOOK REVIEW

159

the Fourteenth Amendment to be identical," or perhaps better put,
"[t]he Amendment did not go beyond the Act; the Act was deemed
to be 'incorporated' in the Amendment." Since abolitionism had so
little role in the drafting of the Reconstruction legislation, Berger
eschews any reliance on "peculiar" Republican readings of important constitutional provisions. He refuses to read the privileges and
immunities clause of article IV as Bingham did, but takes the more
standard approach that Charles Fairman took. In this view, the
privileges and immunities clause is the substantive core of the
amendment, and it supplies exactly the coverage that section one of
the Civil Rights Act had provided. "It protected 'a limited category
of rights.' " "The right to sue for the protection of those rights was
embodied in the due process clause." The equal protection clause
"restated affirmatively the [Civil Rights] Act's negatively framed
proscription of discrimination," although Berger concludes that this
clause is superfluous, since the privileges and immunities clause already does the same.
Professor Berger deserves great credit for his intellectual independence and courage. I am unable, however, to agree with his
analysis. His version of context stands at the very opposite extreme
from Kaczorowski's and has even more severe difficulties. In the
first place, his insistence on the utter primacy of federalism does not
fit the facts. To take but one very clear instance: the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 of which Berger makes so much was itself a tremendous
intrusion on the former federal system. It told the states who their
citizens were; it identified certain rights, which had been within the
exclusive purview of the states, and prohibited them from discriminating in the way they made those rights available to their citizens;
it provided recourse in the federal courts to those who believed they
had been victims of such discrimination; and it provided penalties
against state officials who violated its provisions. This last was an
especially great break with traditional federalism. President Johnson vetoed the bill precisely because it broke so strongly with the
old federalism. So it is wrong to say that the Northern Republicans
were committed to preservation of state authority above all else.
They clearly accepted some change in the old federalism; the real
question is how much. Berger and Kaczorowski appear to fall into
the opposite sides of the same error. Kaczorowski noticed that the
Republicans were willing to set aside at least some elements of the
old federalism in order to secure rights; he concluded that therefore
they were ready in principle to scrap it all. Berger noticed that the
Republicans resisted total centralization, and concluded that therefore they were unwilling to change anything. As J.R.R. Tolkien's
Ents would say, these humans are a hasty lot.
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Berger's treatment of Northern opinion regarding abolitionism
also fails to ring true. Reaction to the antislavery movement shifted
over time; in the immediate wake of the Civil War-that is, at the
time of the drafting of the Civil Rights Act and the fourteenth
amendment-public acceptance of the main elements of the antislavery cause was probably at its height. This is visible in the congressional leadership who led those proposals through the
legislature. As Curtis makes clear, many of the leaders came from
abolitionist backgrounds. Berger attempts to discredit the abolitionists by pointing out how hated Thadeus Stevens was among
moderate Republicans. But the fact remains that Stevens was a recognized leader not merely of the radicals, but of the entire House of
Representatives-chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, House Chairman of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction,
director of the managers appointed by the House to conduct the
impeachment of Andrew Johnson. I have already mentioned similar evidence regarding the high standing and prestige of John Bingham in Congress. One of Berger's problems in treating the role of
abolitionist thought is his inability to distinguish its various shades;
he pushes all anti-slavery thought into the same category. In fact,
however, there was much disagreement among the former abolitionists, as evidenced by their division into radical and moderate wings.
Berger, moreover, consistently proves unable to identify the marks
which truly distinguished one wing from the other. But to discourse further on abolitionism would take us too far afield here.
Even if Berger's broader story about context were more persuasive than it is, the rejection of the incorporation thesis does not follow from it so clearly as he thinks. Let us say that the Republicans
(and the North in general) retained a deep commitment to federalism; let us say that Northern opinion remained racist. It is still
difficult to see how racism would speak one way or another to the
incorporation issue. It was not a racial issue; the application of the
Bill of Rights against the states does not require full racial integration or black suffrage, the two issues where racial feelings clearly
did hold many Northerners back.
It is not even clear that incorporation represents such a major
breach in traditional federalism as Berger consistently asserts: "Application of the Bill of Rights to the States drastically curtails the
right of the Northern states to control their own internal affairs."
Maybe so, maybe not. Fairman, in his effort to prove that incorporation was ridiculous, could come up with only a few (and relatively
minor) instances where Northern states had provisions and procedures contrary to the Bill of Rights. Apparently, most Northerners

1991]

BOOK REVIEW

161

agreed that there was no rightful freedom in the states to violate the
provisions of the Bill of Rights. We must recall what Berger often
seems to forget: all this happened long before the Warren Court
began to interpret the Bill of Rights in ways that did indeed challenge many of the prerogatives to which the states had become accustomed. In 1866, it was thought that the Northern states were
already pretty much in conformity with the Bill of Rights, and it
would, therefore, not be a major alteration of the status quo to make
such conformity a constitutional requirement. Berger repeatedly
makes statements like the following: "Curtis would be hard-pressed
to name one Northern 'politician' who openly preferred federal to
State control of criminal and civil administration in his own state."
But this is to set up a straw dichotomy. Incorporation in 1866 did
not mean "federal control of criminal and civil administration" in
the states; it meant the prescription of certain limits and procedures
which were mostly satisfied, or thought to be satisfied, even without
incorporation. Berger, in other words, regularly exaggerates the
implications of incorporation for federalism.
Another nearly certain indication that Berger's use of context
is leading him astray is the reappearance in his book of Fairman's
"arrant nonsense" approach to the leading spokesmen for the fourteenth amendment. "Bingham's remarks are rife with contradictions." Bingham spoke with "glaring inexactitude." "In truth,
Bingham was utterly confused [not mistaken, but confused] as to
what Barron v. Baltimore held." It is an almost certain tip-off that
an historian is not approaching his or her materials with an accurate frame of reference if important historical actors make no sense
at all to the historian. Important historical actors (and this was
true for Bingham, Howard, and others involved in the drafting and
adoption of the amendment) make sense to those around them; that
is why they are important actors. The historian's task is to bring
out their sense, not to denounce them as fools.
These problems with context in Berger are so important because context plays such a significant role in his history. It leads
him to establish a very high burden of proof for the incorporation
thesis to meet-something on the order at least of "beyond a reasonable doubt"; but in practice close to "near certainty." It leads
him to discount much of the direct evidence supporting incorporation and to fail to notice much other such evidence. In the former
category are the extraordinarily important speeches by Bingham
and Howard in the House and Senate. Bingham wrote the amendment and served on the Joint Committee. Howard reported the
amendment to the Senate on behalf of the Joint Committee. They
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were the ones who came to their respective Houses with the specific
authority to explain the meaning of the amendment as understood
by the Committee which had prepared and was recommending it.
All members of both houses would take these explanations as especially authoritative. All historians therefore should do the same unless persuaded by strong evidence to the contrary.
Both Bingham and Howard said as clearly as they could that
the amendment would incorporate the Bill of Rights. And no one
denied this either openly or by clear implication; many things were
said that do not necessarily imply incorporation, but are compatible
with it. There is far more evidence of a supportive kind than either
Berger or Fairman concedes. Some of it appears in Kaczorowski's
book, as we have already noted. Much of it even appears in Berger's book. Apparently not noticing how it bears on his own case,
Berger quotes against Curtis a statement by William D. Kelley, Republican from Pennsylvania, about the evils the Republicans were
attempting to remedy: "Northerners could go South but once there
they could not express their thoughts as freemen and receive the
protection they were entitled to as citizens of the Republic."
Kelley was complaining of the violation of the rights of whites
here, and the right he spoke up for was the first amendment right of
free speech. Richard Yates of Illinois asked in the Senate, along the
same lines, "Do you suppose any of you can go South and express
your sentiments freely and in safety?" A particularly telling passage by James Wilson: blacks "must have the same liberty of
speech in any part of the South as they have always had in the
North." And of course Curtis cites many other examples where Bill
of Rights guarantees are listed among those requiring protection
under the amendment or the Civil Rights Act.
Probably the greatest importance of Berger's study lies in his
unrelenting effort to limit the scope of the fourteenth amendment by
identifying it entirely with the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Berger's
attempt to identify the two runs afoul of some very important facts,
and thereby shows, I think, the inherent limits of the thesis. In the
first place, the original Bingham draft for the amendment was introduced before the Civil Rights Act; its key language therefore predated the list of rights in the latter bill. Secondly, despite Berger's
dismissal of the point, the language of the two is quite different, and
it seems odd for the framers to aim at nothing other than the constitutionalization of the one in the quite different language of the
other. If they merely sought to get the Civil Rights Act into the
Constitution why did they not simply take its first section and use it
for the amendment?
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More decisively, Berger cannot make the language of the fourteenth amendment fit the Civil Rights Act. As he insists throughout, the Civil Rights Act was limited in two respects: it only
mandated non-discrimination with respect to a limited set of enumerated rights. That is, it did not provide absolute protection for
those rights, nor did it provide across-the-board protection from
discrimination. But the fourteenth amendment, even on Berger's
reading, is different. Even if Berger is correct, for example, about
the meaning of "privileges or immunities" as identical to the list of
rights in the Civil Rights Act, he surely must notice that the fourteenth amendment does not protect them merely against discriminatory treatment. Only if one reads this clause together with the
equal protection clause does one begin to get something like Berger's identity between the two reconstruction acts. But the two
clauses are obviously separate, and obviously have separate force.
For one thing, the one applies to "citizens" and the other to "persons," a distinction which Berger depreciates, but which has clear
textual significance. The Civil Rights Act and the fourteenth
amendment obviously stand as closely related measures, and therefore the tendency of many Republicans to blend them together is
perfectly intelligible, especially in polemical contexts, but Berger's
attempt to show that they are simply identical does not succeed. It
is Berger's great virtue that he has made the thesis of identity a very
explicit theme of his book and has thus unintentionally helped his
readers to reject this thesis which has always had a certain casual
plausibility and attractiveness, but which is ultimately untenable.
The three books reviewed here show that the optimism of fourteenth amendment historians is not wholly misplaced. We can
learn from all three, and from Curtis we have findings which in my
opinion are solid and reliable. This is not to say that his book could
not use some fine-tuning; occasionally he falls into a Kaczorowskilike conviction about the thorough and complete remaking of the
constitutional order. And his study of the incorporation issues
needs to be supplemented with equally thorough consideration of
the rest of the first section of the amendment. But for the most part
he has constructed a plausible version of context that he uses judiciously to render intelligible events and words that have often baffled scholars.

